Disrupting environmental crime at the local level: an operational perspective by Barrett, S & White, R
ARTICLE
Disrupting environmental crime at the local level:
an operational perspective
Stoyan Barrett1 & Rob White 2
ABSTRACT The multi-dimensional nature of environmental crimes requires innovative
means to combat them. This paper examines the nature and dynamics of one particular
collaborative law enforcement approach directed at environmental crime. While much
interest in multi-agency and multi-pronged approaches has been generated in recent years,
especially as this pertains to environmental crime at the international and regional levels, this
paper provides a detailed description of how this can occur at the local level. Based on a case
study of nefarious activities relating to illegal waste management in Durham and surrounding
areas (located in the North East of England), the paper emphasises the importance of ‘dis-
ruption’ as an important operational concept, and how inter-agency cooperation under skilled
leadership and with clear purpose can lead to tangible enforcement outcomes. As the article
demonstrates, particular agencies on their own have limited impact and do not always
address the issue of how to take away an organised criminal group’s ability to function. By
contrast, multi-agency work enables authorities to work in a united front and thus to succeed
in disrupting criminal activities causing environmental harm.
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Introduction
One of the hallmarks of contemporary environmentalcrime is that such crime more likely than not involves‘convergence crime’ (Pink and White, 2016; INTERPOL,
2015; INTERPOL and UNEP, 2016). This refers to how particular
environmental offences, such as illegal disposal of waste and
trafﬁcking in wildlife, can also simultaneously be associated with
other criminal offences or illegal activities, from bribery and
corruption through to failure to have required permits. The
multi-dimensional nature of environmental crimes, while com-
plicating things, also opens the door to innovative means to
combat them.
Moreover, the purposes of environmental law enforcement
may be effectively served by measures other than prosecuting
offenders directly for the offensive behaviour in question. For
instance, in order to protect environments and preserve ecological
integrity, it is sometimes more effective, from the point of view of
environmental outcomes, to focus on disrupting crime in order to
diminish its occurrence. In orienting towards ‘disruption’, it is
possible to mobilise a number of tactics that impede the ability of
offenders to function (Dighe and Pettus, 2011). This is a central
theme of the present article. Reliance upon the formal processes
of criminal justice including prosecution, conviction and sen-
tencing, may be less important in this scenario than stopping or
frustrating the offending by employment of other means.
Collaboration and partnerships are frequently touted as a key
means of ﬁghting organised criminal networks involved with
diverse commodities and activities (Pink and White, 2016;
Crawford and Cunningham, 2015). This paper examines the
nature and dynamics of one particular collaborative law enfor-
cement approach directed at disrupting environmental crime.
While much interest in multi-agency and multi-pronged
approaches has been generated in recent years, especially as this
pertains to environmental crime at the international, national and
regional levels, this paper provides a detailed description of how
this can occur at the local level. Based on a case study of nefarious
activities relating to illegal waste management in Durham, United
Kingdom and surrounding areas, the paper emphases the
importance of ‘disruption’ as an important operational concept,
and how inter-agency cooperation under skilled leadership and
with clear purpose can lead to tangible enforcement outcomes.
Collaborative environmental law enforcement
The initial importance of multi-agency networking and colla-
borative practices stems from simple economics, especially given
the pressures for environmental law enforcement to improve at
the same time as the need for it expands. The effectiveness of
environmental law enforcement, particularly in the light of
restricted budgets and under-resourced units, will very much
depend upon how well partnerships are formed and strategies
implemented, and the ﬂexibility of interventions in the context of
rapid social and ecological change.
Some of the limitations of conventional environmental law
enforcement practices and procedures are well known by practi-
tioners and academics alike. For example, in recent work under-
taken at the University of Tasmania on the policing of the disposal
of hazardous waste it was found that there was poor data man-
agement, limited data sharing, the absence of routine data analysis,
barriers when it comes to prosecution of offenders, and uncer-
tainty as to who is meant to police which types of waste (White
and Heckenberg, 2011). Across Australia there are major com-
plexities related to deﬁning and classifying ‘waste’, and little cross-
departmental dialogue about intervention procedures and dealing
with problems in achieving effective compliance and enforcement.
Importantly, as is the case with much environmental prosecution
generally (White, 2016), there are major issues when it comes to
sentencing and penalties. In a nutshell, very often judges and
magistrates do not seem to take environmental crime seriously, are
inconsistent in their sentencing, and lack understanding of the
implications of both the crimes and the impact of lenient sen-
tencing in relation to these crimes.
All these factors point in the direction of substantial changes in
operational practices if environmental law enforcement is to
progress towards a more meaningful and powerful level of
intervention. There is certainly the necessity for the development
of closer working partnerships among diverse stakeholders, as
well as development of better data analysis for the purposes of
future planning and strategic intervention. Drawing out the ‘big
stick’ is also required to support stronger enforcement approaches
rather than relying upon weak and frequently ineffective com-
pliance measures (such as on-the-spot ﬁnes).
To be effective, agencies need to be able to harness the coop-
eration and expertise of many different contributors and liaise
with relevant partners at the local through to the international
levels (Crawford, 2008). But what do we actually mean by terms
such as ‘partnership’ and ‘collaboration’? These can be under-
stood in various ways.
In its most basic sense, collaboration simply refers to people or
agencies working together for a shared purpose. However, the
meaning and social processes pertaining to collaboration-in-
practice can be complicated and variable. To illustrate this, con-
sider the following example. Within a prison context, collabora-
tion means that prison ofﬁcers, therapeutic staff, senior managers,
teachers, nurses and doctors, case managers and support staff
work—that is, all of those who work within the institutional
hierarchy—work in unison and with shared purpose around
prisoner issues. Simultaneously, these staff need to be able to
collaborate with the many outside persons coming into the
prison, such as the drug and alcohol counsellors, the youth
workers, representatives of welfare agencies and government
bureaucracies, sex offender specialists and so on; that is, those
who offer skills across institutional settings (White and Graham,
2010). These dimensions can easily be transposed into an envir-
onmental law enforcement context.
For example, to build capacity and capability, the activities and
collaborations of environmental crime response agencies has
tended to naturally occur around networks, which are
geographically-based (for example, known transit points and
destinations in Asia), discipline-based (for example, environ-
mental prosecutors) and commodity-based (for example, wildlife)
Table 1 Types of inter- and intra- agency collaboration
Horizontal
• Issues relevant to a number of agencies
• Emphasis on ‘something is being done’
For example, Police, Customs, National Security, Environmental
Protection Agencies
Vertical
• Among employees within an institutional hierarchy
• Emphasis on ‘how something is done’
For example, protocols for forensic environmental investigation
processes
Diagonal
• Collaboration across the horizontal and vertical axis
• Emphasis on ‘the way something is done’
For example, agency interactions by species, by region, by type of agency
Source: Pink and White, 2016.
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(Pink and Bartel, 2015). Collaboration across these dimensions
and involving these networks can be predominantly horizontal,
vertical or diagonal. These different types of collaboration are
summarised in Table 1. There is no ﬁxed or usual way in which
collaboration occurs—instead the collaboration takes its shape
depending on a number of factors, including if and how various
networks are constituted. What is clear though is that for envir-
onmental crime, collaboration matters (Pink and White, 2016).
Much of the literature on environmental enforcement and
collaboration has focused on networks at the national and
international levels. In regards to transnational environmental
crime, the International Network of Environmental Compliance
and Enforcement (INECE) provides a case in point, as does the
Interpol Environmental Crimes Committee. Regional and
national networks of enforcement personnel and regulatory
agencies are further examples of grounded collaboration invol-
ving diverse sets of players (Faure et al., 2015).
Taking the lead in developing new forms of collaboration and
active engagement, in 2012 INTERPOL established the National
Environmental Security Taskforce (NEST) model (INTERPOL,
2012; Higgins and White, 2016). The NEST is conceptual fra-
mework where various representatives from a range of agencies
come together to contribute and leverage from the groups col-
lective skill sets in order to more effectively develop, coordinate
and implement response measures. In the Asia-Paciﬁc, the lead
agencies in the development of the NEST were Australia and New
Zealand, with the NEST model drawing heavily upon the New
Zealand Wildlife Enforcement Group (WEG) model. The WEG
approach saw police, customs and environmental ofﬁcers organise
themselves in a coordinated tri-agency arrangement to respond to
wildlife crime (Pink G (2015) Personal Communication. [at the
time of contact for this, Grant Pink was the Australian repre-
sentative to the INTERPOL Environmental Crime Committee]).
At its most basic level, a NEST is a task force of a ﬁrmly
established team of experts who work together to address speciﬁc
issues. They are comprised of senior criminal investigators,
criminal analysts, training ofﬁcers, prosecutors, ﬁnancial specia-
lists, forensic experts and others, drawn from police, customs,
environmental and other specialised enforcement agencies, and
also involving non-government and regional organisations as
appropriate.
This formal networking is essential in several different ways. It
allows for sharing of ideas and information about ‘best practice’.
It enables participants to gain a perspective on environmental
crimes that occur within speciﬁc local and regional contexts and
those that are more global in scope. It fosters cross-agency
cooperation and intelligence exchanges within speciﬁc national
contexts (horizontal connections that bring together environ-
mental protection authority, police, customs, and other agency
personnel), as well as internationally (vertical connections that
bring together national representatives from different parts of the
world, including United Nations personnel).
However, while the work on collaboration and networking
points in the right direction, and includes important critical
commentary on the strengths and limitations of collaborative
arrangements, it still largely deals with collaboration among law
enforcement agencies. As discussed below, there is much to be
gained, and learned from, those instances of collaboration that
range further aﬁeld. Just as environmental crime converges with
other crimes so, too, environmental law enforcement can incor-
porate a wide range of stakeholders and players. If the purpose or
end in doing so is disruption of the harmful activity, then the
beneﬁts are clear.
Carnwell and Carson (2005) distinguish between ‘partnerships’
(who we are) and ‘collaborations’ (what we do). In so doing, they
describe different types of partnership, ranging from those based
on a particular project or particular social problem, through to
ideological and ethical partnerships that involve shared perspec-
tives and speciﬁc viewpoints. Collaboration is seen as the process
of working together in a particular kind of partnership although it
is only one of several methods of doing so. As will be demon-
strated, collaboration is, as much as anything, dictated by cir-
cumstance and contingency. And a lot depends upon how it
works at the local level.
The lucrative nature of transnational environmental crime
combined with the complexity of the networks and commodity
chains associated with it, means that developing an effective law
enforcement response is particularly challenging. Typically, the
organised criminal modus operandi is one characterised as being
loose, transnational, motivated by singular purpose, and networks
formed on an ad hoc basis. By contrast, the typical law enforce-
ment modus operandi is tight, jurisdiction-based, informed by
multiple institutional demands, and subject to formalised
arrangements and agreements (White and Heckenberg, 2014).
Translated into crime ﬁghting at the local level, this means that
effective crime disruption must be tuned into the vagaries of the
speciﬁc crimes and speciﬁc criminal networks operating at this
level.
It can be observed that environmental regulation and enfor-
cement frequently only ﬁnds effective purchase within particular
jurisdictions and national contexts. Thus, for example, new forms
of intervention, such as ‘environmental enforcement sweeps’, are
now being applied where a speciﬁc community faces multiple
environmental burdens. Such sweeps involve the use of admin-
istrative, civil and criminal enforcement tools in tandem to
address the problems in a comprehensive fashion (Dighe and
Pettus, 2011). Factory pollution, for example, might be responded
to by examination of the permit compliance history of companies,
investigation of violations of different environmental laws, and
involvement of multiple agencies alongside community input.
This model seems to present an ideal method of responding to
environmental problems. It is also precisely the kind of thinking
that informs our case study.
Local multi-agency intervention in Durham
Research speciﬁcally on environmental crimes has pointed to the
great variation in who participates in this criminal activity and
how they do so (Ayling, 2013; Wyatt, 2013). Indeed, there is a
conjunction of many different factors that go into why and how
such activity takes place (Lemieux, 2014; Wellsmith, 2011; Pires
and Moreto, 2011; Pires, 2012). This means that any response to
speciﬁc types of illegal activities must be tailored to the circum-
stances within which they occur. It also implies that the notion of
‘organised criminal networks’ has to be interpreted widely, to
capture the diversity of ways in which people interact with each
other in particular actor networks. Moreover, distinctions need to
be made between localised activity based upon subsistence and/or
family ties and activity involving organised criminal gangs seek-
ing large proﬁts from international sales (Ayling, 2013; Von Essen
et al., 2014).
The case study below identiﬁes how Organised Crime Groups
(OCG) can manipulate lawful processes by exploiting loopholes
within these processes, for ﬁnancial gain. Organised crime often
manifests as legitimate business when really it is focussed on
extracting as much proﬁt as possible including from illegal
activity. For present purposes, organised crime is deﬁned as
serious crime that is planned, coordinated and conducted by
people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation
is often, but not always, ﬁnancial gain. Individuals working
together for criminal purposes are called an Organised Crime
Group (National Crime Agency, 2017).
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0006-3 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:  2 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0006-3 |www.nature.com/palcomms 3
In this instance, the Organised Criminal Group was mainly
locally based, and involved several family members among others.
The commission of the crimes occurred locally, and the harms,
therefore, were felt most acutely at the local level. The criminal
network had both publicly recognisable members and ‘silent’
members, as explained below. The crimes were intentional and
organised. They knew perfectly well what they were doing.
Within the United Kingdom, the Environment Agency over-
sees waste management (Environment Agency, 2017). This
activity consists of the monitoring of onsite working practices,
investigation of air, water and land pollution, and the correct
processing of all waste types. Its mandate includes recycling of
waste as well as the production, transportation and disposal of
waste. If we examine the traditional route path of a waste skip
ﬁlled with mixed waste, then this contextualises the case study
below. A full skip is usually collected and removed to a waste
transfer station. Usually the waste station is industrial sized, has
large capacity and has several employees. Here the waste is
separated, with some removed for recycling, and the remainder is
sieved further into an almost soil-like form. This product is
considered less damaging to the environment and is considered
suitable for landﬁll (and, accordingly, attracts a low tax rate).
Crime Particulars. A local skip hire company was formed as a
legitimate business operating across Durham and Darlington
situated within the North East of England. As a permitted com-
pany, their business involved the hire of a variety of skips,
approximately 100 in total covering a large area of North East
England and North Yorkshire. Their business was usually to
private individuals but always on a cash basis. This provided the
ﬁrst opportunity for manipulation with the average skip costing
approximately £100 per day.
Once the full skips were collected they would be returned to
one of three industrial sized compounds where anything of any
intrinsic value would be separated and sold for recycling while the
remainder was stockpiled. The stockpiling of the waste was
supposed to be sieved down to its most basic form and land ﬁlled
at the lowest tax rate, approximately £5 per tonne (by contrast,
raw waste costs approximately £120 per tonne in landﬁll tax).
This provided the second area of manipulation.
Initially nothing appeared untoward and of no concern for the
lead response agency, the UK Environment Agency, as any
manipulation was in its infancy and undetected. However, as the
sites began to ﬁll it became abundantly obvious that the
processing and removal of the waste was not being completed
as agreed within the permits.
The Environment Agency began enquiries in 2008 when
concerns were raised about the scale of unprocessed waste evident
across the sites. The initial response was to offer assistance and
request compliance, rather than proceeding to prosecution. This
is considered normal practice and allows legitimate operators
time to comply with the requests being made. All the while,
however, more waste was arriving, with little or no compliance.
Finally, later in 2009 the Environment Agency opted to begin
prosecutorial action for non-compliance and remove their
permits to process any further waste.
It is worth pointing out that in our view this particular
Organised Criminal Group would have been aware of the lead in
and overall timescale involved of any legal action; however,
their illegal activity continued and the sites continue to ﬁll as did
their pockets. They did offer some legal challenge to the
actions of the Environment Agency, maintaining that their
activities were still legitimate, but one suspects that this was again
nothing more than smoke and mirrors as part of delaying the
legal process.
In July 2012, the Environment Agency successfully prosecuted
the OCG on ten counts of illegal waste management. However,
the sentencing was deferred as similar offences were still in
process and the OCG members were released on strict bail
conditions until all matters could be heard. During this time, the
OCG, despite being convicted, continued to bring up legal
challenges on the verdict and to maintain their innocence. And all
the while the trucks continue to roll.
This posed a major dilemma for the Environment Agency.
They had done everything within their power to stop this OCG
from continuing their business, even successfully securing
convictions, but were despondent at the OCGs continuing
actions. Moreover, to compound things, this kind of crime is
always something that the authorities have to play catch up on,
once the damage is already done.
As a consequence of the above developments, the Environment
Agency approached the Durham Police in September 2012 and
asked for assistance to physically stop the continuing actions of
the OCG. Parenthetically, the ofﬁcer who was ﬁrst requested to
tackle this OCG (one of the co-authors) was on restricted duties
and, therefore, was unable to face any confrontation or interact in
the traditional way with members of the public at the time.
Therefore, he only had a telephone, a computer screen and
powers of persuasion to work with. One can speculate whether
given a different personal situation he may not have decided on
the route chosen to undermine the OCG.
Imagination was helpful as well. The ofﬁcer had a lifelong
interest in WW1 and, at this juncture, while he sat staring into
the computer screen wondering how to tackle the OCG, he began
to think of how the allies achieved success during WW1 and his
thoughts were immediately taken to the Battle of Amiens, 1918.
The battle of Amiens was short by the campaign standards
of that time. Nonetheless, it was well conceived, planned and
executed, achieving a seven-mile advance in 1 day. Considering
that successes in WW1 were measured in yards rather than
miles it had a profound effect and the tactics adopted then
are still used to the present day. The reason why this campaign
was a success was because it was the ﬁrst time the allies had
coordinated an attack using aerial power to spot and direct
artillery. The artillery additionally utilised a creeping barrage
while the advance followed some distance behind the shelter it
was providing. Tanks led the assault with infantry following who
were equipped with more automatic weapons than previously
had been the case. The net result was a seven-mile gain during the
ﬁrst day.
Disrupting the OCG. Initial thoughts concerning the OCG fol-
lowed this logic. The starting point was to scope their activity in
full, examining all their activities to identify any wrongdoing that
would assist in undermining their ability to function. Time was
also spent identifying any ‘Quick Wins’. This formed the basis of
the strategy subsequently adopted.
By scoping the activity of the OCG, a number of anomalies
were identiﬁed. The anomalies concerned different agencies—
such as local council planning breaches, utility companies and
insurance providers. These formed the key agencies that were
brought together to form a group to undermine the OCG. This
was the beginning of a coordinated attack, with the key agencies
representing the different limbs of the military in the battle of
Amiens.
As previously mentioned, the OCG had been convicted and
released on stringent bail conditions. One of the conditions was to
cease any transfer of new waste into any of the sites. They
continued to breach the condition; therefore, a number of covert
operations were mounted to capture evidence that would
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eventually remand one of the principle members in jail while
awaiting sentence.
Despite this success, the waste kept rolling in.
The next tactic was to examine the transport being used to
continue their activity. The transport manager in this case had
been a legitimate haulier up until the ﬁnancial crash of 2008 that
hit his business hard. He sold a number of vehicles and laid
drivers off; however, provisions within his operator’s licence
allowed him to manage additional trucks. The OCG employed the
transport manager at the outset of their venture because none of
them ﬁtted the criterion or qualiﬁcation to perform the role. He
was the next target for intervention.
As the transport manager, he was solely responsible for the
activities of vehicles belonging to the OCG, vehicles which had
been used to illegally transfer waste into the sites following
convictions. Therefore, he had to provide a credible explanation
for his actions. He was interviewed concerning his involvement
and told that if he did not heed the warning and remove himself
from this position then he would be relieved of his operator’s
licence. He assured the police that no further illegal operations
would ensue.
Fortunately, around this time the convictions of the OCG had
been widely publicised and appeared in the local newspapers with
photographs, one of which clearly identiﬁed the registration
number of one of their trucks. The scoping activity had identiﬁed
the vehicle insurance company responsible for the OCG. This
company was approached and alerted to the fact that they were in
fact insuring convicted criminals who had no regard concerning
any risk and liability that may come from their wrongdoing. This
conversation prompted the insurance company to withdraw
cover provided for the OCG. Now for the ﬁrst time their
transport activity stopped.
The transport manager was wise to suspend activity following
the previous warning. Nonetheless, he went on to re-insure with a
new insurer but failed to disclose that his previous insurer had
revoked the policy. That was the next port of call. The new
insurer was disclosed the same facts as before, with the addition
of the transport manager’s lies at the inception of the policy. The
insurer withdrew cover and the whole thing started again with
another insurer. Three times this occurred until no one would
provide insurance cover or it was at a price well beyond what the
OCG wished to pay. Additionally, and more importantly, the
transport manager had by his actions lied on three occasions to
the insurers to obtain cover, effectively committing fraud. Now
there was an opportunity to remove him, effectively leaving the
OCG without a transport manager or insurance cover. The
operations stopped.
Now that there was a principle OCG member in prison, and
with the transport manager withdrawn and being pursued for
illegality, there was nobody to replace him and no insurance
company offering to provide vehicle insurance. On the face of it
this looked good, however, there were still two sites full of waste
and no idea of by whom or when it might be cleared.
In May 2013, the principle member of the OCG was granted
bail via a judge in chambers and within 1 week of his release one
of the sites caught ﬁre. Ten thousand tonnes of waste were alight
which took 45 ﬁre ﬁghters 1 week to effectively bring under
control. The problem now was dramatically heightened, with
considerable public concern being expressed about the activities
of the OCG. The local MP championed the constituents concerns
and publicly announced that the enforcement agencies had sat on
their hands and allowed the situation to develop. She was
diplomatically informed that the agencies had done all in their
power to prevent the activity of the OCG by conventional means
and that they, along with the police, had now embarked on other
methods as the criminal justice system had effectively not been
able to address the issue. She became an ally and spokesperson, as
well as provided political muscle when needed to oil the wheels of
the agencies working to disrupt the OCG.
The dilemma now concerned the removal of 10,000 tonnes of
smouldering waste that owing to its state could not be left; but to
remove it at the public purse would have been unthinkable. Very
detailed scoping identiﬁed the land owner, who turned out to be a
cash rich individual and a principle OCG member. This individual
had previously sat on the periphery of the OCG but more research
revealed him as the brains behind the outﬁt. He had provided two
of the sites to the OCG, outwardly appearing as the landlord, but
he had also provided the money and means to set up the operation
and was creaming off the money it had generated.
The OCG on paper had no identiﬁable budget and as such
could not pay for any of the accumulated clearance costs. The
landlord pleaded innocence and that he could not be held to
account for the actions of his tenants. What he had not accounted
for was the detailed analysis of his involvement that also
identiﬁed wrongdoing on his part. He had purchased the land
for one of the sites from a neighbouring company. The
neighbouring company was aware that the land was to be used
as a waste transfer station and as such included a caveat within
the original contract of sale forbidding the storage of waste
outside the building on the site. In the event, 90,000 tonnes of
waste were sat outside the site. The plaintiff in this case, however,
was fearful of reprisal and had not actioned the breach. The
company concerned was approached by the police and reassured
that all the key agencies involved would support their action if
they brought the matter to Court.
In Newcastle County Court in July 2013 the plaintiff won
against the OCG. There was a clear breach of contract and the
Court ordered the clear up of the site within 3 months, total cost
approximately £500,000, with £62,000 costs levied at the cash rich
individual. At this the landlord and another principle OCG
member began to ﬁght in the foyer of the Court building. By
September that year, one of the two sites full of waste was cleared
at the cost of the OCG.
The second site was full of waste and therefore also of great
concern as it, too, posed a substantial ﬁre risk. The second site
was also owned by the same landlord, but this time there was no
breach of contract to force his hand to clear it up.
In this instance, another neighbouring company to the second
site, a small engineering company contacted the police. The
managing director informed the police that their insurers had
expressed concern at the waste pile at the adjoining premises and
that they were not prepared to offer any further cover without a
substantial increase in premium due to the ﬁre risk. She went on
to say that as the company was working to very tight margins
they only had three options: (1) move premises, not ﬁnancially
viable; (2) lay off staff to cover the increase in insurance premium;
or (3) close. None of these options were acceptable, and it took
hard work hard to secure insurance and reassure the insurance
company that the waste would be removed. This was a separate
story completely and one which concerned the insurance, and not
the OCG directly. However, it does illustrate that a consequence
of their wrongdoing was to put at risk local livelihoods. This is
not an ideal situation.
Intense scoping of the second site commenced. The ideal
situation would be that the cash rich landlord would be cited as
being responsible for the clear up, as with the ﬁrst site. After
considerable consultation, it was identiﬁed that at the outset of
the business the Local Authority had granted planning permis-
sion for the site to operate as a waste transfer station, but because
of the previous wrongdoing the Environment Agency had
removed permits allowing such activity. The site, therefore, had
effectively become the ﬁnal resting place of the waste and this was
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something that breached the planning regulation. The real nugget
in this ﬁnd was that it cited the landlord as well as tenant as being
responsible for the clear up.
This action as well as the threat of some minor action taken by
the Environment Agency against the landlord resulted in a deal
being negotiated whereby the Environment Agency would stave
off their prosecutions if the landlord cleared the site at his own
expense. He had no choice as the planning regulations if pursued
identiﬁed him as responsible for clear up cost plus the additional
legal costs. He reluctantly agreed and cleared the site at an
approximate cost of £300,000.
Nearby jobs were safeguarded and as such the local economy
protected. There was also no option left for the OCG to set ﬁre to
the premises.
This was effectively the ﬁnal straw. Members of the OCG were
tried for the subsequent offences and some received custodial
sentences. The transport manager had left, the company had been
dissolved and the landlord had been left with considerable costs.
The OCG was for all intents and purposes dismantled.
How was this achieved? The activity of the OCG was scoped in
order to identify anomalies. A group of relevant stakeholders was
organised to address those anomalies. Not only were these
agencies best placed to address the anomalies none of them ever
did anything alone. The agencies always acted in a coordinated
manner with a common goal that was to undermine the ability of
the OGC to function. This was not always focussed on
prosecution but more towards disruption of the OCG activities.
Multi-agency collaboration
Detailed thick description of this case has demonstrated that
investigative nous involving deep scoping of the Organised
Criminal Group created an opportunity for innovative responses
to the crimes associated with illegal waste dumping and stock-
piling. An initial starting point was scoping the criminal targets to
ascertain the nature and dynamics of the people and activities
associated with the Organised Criminal Group. As part of this
process, there was the equivalent of an environmental
enforcement sweep (Dighe and Pettus, 2011), that is, lateral
thinking directed at ﬁnding ways to disrupt the activities of the
OCG across various administrative and legal fronts.
Collaboration was born out of necessity, since conventional
criminal justice pathways had failed to secure environmental
wellbeing. Those involved included local agencies and actors who
worked in tandem to address the evils in their midst. Figure 1
outlines the many agencies that in some way were involved
(although these were not all mentioned in the narrative above).
Importantly, the coordination of these agencies was provided by
the police who offered advice and enabled persistence. This
centralised leadership and drive were essential to the eventual
outcome.
Recent years have seen increased attention to and imple-
mentation of partnership approaches to addressing crime in the
United Kingdom (Crawford and Cunningham, 2015; Berry et al.,
2011; O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014). This has involved police
working closely with a range of government and non-government
agencies and stakeholders with the intent of developing innova-
tive and diverse responses to crime. While there are pitfalls and
limitations associated with these approaches (for example, where
a strategy has multiple aims that reﬂect divergent interests), the
present study reﬂects the potential success of such methods.
The notion of multi-agency collaboration refers to the
engagement of a number of agencies working alongside one
another to disrupt crime. It also refers to the utilisation of a range
of tactics and strategies to disrupt environmental vandalism of the
kind described above. It has been observed that in other jur-
isdictions this combination of partnerships and activities requires
tools and approaches that are ﬁt for purpose (Dighe and Pettus,
2011). In other words, each environmental crime case is different,
and each requires its own tailor-made response. Yet, across
diverse cases, similar principles of intervention can be applied.
Firstly, it is important that local area businesses, agencies and
community groups be brought into the conversation about
damaging environmental practices such as illicit dumping and
storing of waste. The eyes and ears of a locality are its people, and
its interests are also best protected when the community as a
Fig. 1 Multi-agency collaborations with Durham constabulary
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whole is on side and participating in preventing such harms.
Meaningful participation takes several forms, from reporting of
events through to cutting off of power and water due to unpaid
bills. Information can come from many different quarters and
this can be collated and applied by police (among others) to target
the Organised Criminal Group in the most effective way.
Secondly, there is a range of measures that can be mobilised in
tandem to disrupt local criminal activities. As the case example
demonstrates, action taken around licensing and insurance, as well
as criminal prosecution can be brought to bear upon OCGs. As
indicated in Fig. 1, a myriad of agencies may have an interest in
the individuals at the centre of police attention. The obligations of
landholders in regards to site management and health and safety
issues, as well as their ordinary obligations as residents and citi-
zens, can provide important departure points for putting pressure
on them—by neighbours, employees, associates and service pro-
viders—to desist from criminal activities. Gathering information
across these domains can thus provide potential weak points to
undermine present actions and prevent future ones. Again, a
combination of administrative, civil and criminal enforcement
tools can be mobilised, although the speciﬁc content and combi-
nation depends upon the players and the activities in question.
Thirdly, organised criminal groups and illicit networks have
the advantage generally of ﬂexibility and a good working
knowledge of local conditions and actors, which facilitate the
crimes in question. As described earlier, a NEST approach mir-
rors to some extent these attributes. It mobilises a broad range of
actors, with varying types and levels of expertise, with local
through to international connections, around single-purpose
interventions. It has the capacity to provide ‘eyes on the ground’
as well as a ‘bird’s eye’ view of commodity chains and criminal
networks. Yet, at the local level, what seems more appropriate is a
combination of informal and formal collaboration. In part, this
stems from the notion that there is not a ‘one size ﬁts all’ solution
to speciﬁc crimes. Each crime and criminal group is different in
some respects. Moreover, the commitment and interests of sta-
keholders will vary depending upon the matters at hand and the
groups involved. While a general framework for multi-agency
collaboration is useful—for example, a framework that outlines
potential participants, procedures and policies—it would appear
that ad hoc task forces and transient cooperation may well best
match the needs of those at the local level. In other words, the
driving force for collaboration ought to be what is needed in the
here and now, rather than reliant upon bureaucratic requirement
or structured inter-agency engagement (although the latter, too,
have their place in regards to ofﬁcial government agencies).
Conclusion
As this article has illustrated, the disruption of environmental
crime can proceed across several domains at once. Social, poli-
tical, media, administrative and criminal justice actions all in their
own way contributed to the result. Alliances were formed, and
different agencies were involved in ways that reﬂected their tac-
tical strengths—from insurance companies to politicians, police
ofﬁcers to ofﬁcials from environmental protection. The project
had a focus, and the participants zeroed in on the Organised
Criminal Group using the approaches and tools at their disposal.
The message for environmental law enforcement is clear.
Singularly each agency has limited impact and does not always
address the issue of incapacitating the OCG’s ability to function.
By contrast, multi-agency work enables the authorities to work on
a united front and thus to succeed in disrupting the criminal
activities causing environmental harm. Interestingly, in this par-
ticular instance the police had a pivotal coordinating role,
something that is not always the case when it comes to
environmental crime (Nurse, 2015). Whether this is due to the
singular personalities involved, the circumstances of the case, the
fact that an organised criminal group was behind the environ-
mental harm, encouragement from enlightened management, or
a combination of these, is open to debate. Nonetheless, the case
study provides an example of an exciting intervention model that,
in this particular locale, proved highly successful in disrupting
crime.
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